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Introduction
Despite the efforts of more than two generations of demographers, the field of
demography lacks consensus on a unified, comprehensive theory of one of the most important
modern demographic phenomena, namely, the long-term aggregate decline of fertility -- from
averages of 6 to 8 births per woman during her lifetime to averages of well under 2, at least for
the most developed nations.  A fortiori, one cannot speak of validated theory. 
Theoretical literature on the topic can be characterized with three words: proliferation;
incompleteness; imprecision [Two recent critical reviews are Burch, 1995 and Van De Kaa,
1996].  There are many theories of fertility decline, often associated with one discipline or even
one author.  Most of them are incomplete in one way or another.  For example, some of the best-
developed deal only with marital fertility and thus have nothing to say about decline in overall
fertility due to changing marriage patterns.  Many place strong emphasis on one variable or class
of variables [e.g., wealth flows, culture, diffusion, secular individualism, demand for children,
fertility control, etc.] to the relative neglect of other variables or variable sets.  Most are
presented in loose verbal statements, in what Boland [1989] has described as ‘older, more literary
approaches to analysis.’  It often is difficult to know precisely what a given theory asserts, or
what it predicts or implies by strict logical inference.  This has hampered empirical testing.
.  A working definition of theory in this context is: a set of concepts and propositions,1
usually stated in ordinary language, that purports to explain how and why aggregate fertility
decline has occurred.  A model  is a translation of a theory into mathematical or quasi-
mathematical form, and its implementation using a high-level computer language such as
FORTRAN, PASCAL, or C/C++, or into special-purpose software language for mathematics or
systems modelling.  Boland [1989] makes a useful distinction between  pure or abstract models,
which are representations of the underlying logic of the theory being modelled, and applied
models, which are more concrete and explicit, designed to apply to specific real-world problems
or situations [contrast a model of fertility decline in general with a model of fertility decline in
India, 1900 to date].    
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I have suggested elsewhere that an important part of the solution to the above problems
will be the development of broad computer models of fertility decline, synthesizing the disparate
theories referred to above.   Synthesis, by definition, will tend to reduce incompleteness.  The use1
of modern computer modelling languages will facilitate more comprehensive statements, since
they enable the analyst to deal with more variables and more propositions than can be dealt with
rigorously using ordinary language, formal logic, even analytic mathematics.  Computer
modelling will promote clarity and precision, because, without unambiguous ideas and
statements of relationships, models cannot be compiled and run.  Finally, computer models of
theories will generate determinate logical implications subject to empirical testing.  The
comment of Rosero-Bixby and Casterline is apt: ‘Mathematical models bind theory to precise
formulations, and by doing so accentuate logical inconsistencies in theories and facilitate their
testing’ [1993].
This paper is a first step toward a comprehensive model of fertility decline as called for
above.  Its core is a synthesis of the basic socio-economic theory of marital fertility due to
Easterlin [1969, 1975] with the diffusion model of Rosero-Bixby and Casterline [1993].  Some
obvious links of the model with the cultural and institutional theories of Lesthaege [1983 and 
4Lesthaege and Surkyn, 1988] and of Caldwell [1976, 1982] are sketched, but these complex
theories have not yet been modelled.
The next section gives brief sketches of the central theoretical ideas of the above authors,
highlighting complementarities and possibilities for synthesis.  Following that, a synthetic model
is presented, graphically and in the difference-equation language of Professional Dynamo Plus. 
Illustrative output is given for Taiwan [1957-63], a case documented by Crimmins, Easterlin,
Jejeebhoy, and Srinivasan [1984].  
A concluding section discusses the large elements of incompleteness remaining in the
model presented, and suggests directions for needed further development. 
Four Theories/Models of Fertility Decline 
The theoretical works of Caldwell, Easterlin, and Lesthaege are well-known.  I do not try
to describe them in all their richness and detail, developed over many years.  What follows are
thumbnail sketches, focussing on the core ideas.  The key ideas of Rosero-Bixby and Casterline
already are stated in model form, and so can be given quite succintly and precisely.
According to Easterlin, marital fertility declines when couples practice effective
contraception to control family size.  This occurs when motivation to control fertility exceeds
the costs of doing so.   Motivation is a function of the desired number of surviving children
[the number the couple would want if control of fertility were cost-free] and of the potential
number of surviving children [the number that the couple would have in the absence of any
attempt to control fertility].  The potential number of surviving children is a function of natural
marital fertility [the number of births a couple would have if they did nothing to control
5fertility] and the level of mortality [more specifically, the probability of a child surviving from
birth to adulthood].  Natural marital fertility is defined as a function of fecundity, lactation, and
fetal mortality.  Following standard microeconomics, desired family size is defined as a function
of  income, prices of children relative to other goods, and tastes or preferences for children
relative to other goods.  Easterlin assumes that the couple makes their decision early in marriage,
with a view to the maximization of lifetime utility.  He emphasizes that the relevant measures of
several key variables [e.g., potential children, costs of fertility control, etc.] are the subjective
perceptions of the couple, not objective reality.
The Easterlin model is relatively clear and unambiguous, partly because it inherits ideas
from formal demography, reproductive biology, and microeconomics.  But it is not yet a model
in the sense defined in fn.1 above.  Some of the functional relationships, for instance, are not
fully defined.  Fertility control is said to occur when motivation > costs; but it is not clear
whether the strength of motivation can be defined as a simple difference between the two.  Costs
of fertility regulation are in some contexts proxies or operationalized as inversely related to the
number of methods known.  But again, no specific functional definition is given.  In empirical
illustrations, some of the variables, notably, desired family size are measured directly from
survey data, rather than modelled as a function of income, prices, and tastes.  And, by default,
many subjective variables [e.g., perceived survival probabilities] are in fact measured by
objective indicators.
An interesting feature of the Easterlin model is that it relates to supply of as well as
demand for children.  An important consequence is that rising fertility in the very earliest stages
of development can be accommodated within his framework.
6Rosero-Bixby [1993] present a dynamical model [compartment model] in which married
women of reproductive age move through three different states: 1] ’natural,’ in which they have
no interest in controlling their fertility; 2] ‘latent,’ in which they want to control fertility but are
not doing so for whatever reason; 3] ‘control,’ in which they are deliberately controlling fertility. 
The movement from the ‘natural’ to the ‘latent’ state is governed by a constant a, defined as the
‘instant rate of demand for birth control.’  The movement from the ‘latent’ state to the ‘control’
state is governed by a constant b, defined as the ‘instant rate of access to birth control.’  
Fertility is defined as a weighted average of fertility in the control state and in the non-control
states.  Total size of the population of married women of reproductive age is kept constant, with
a factor m governing entries [aging, marriage, etc.] and exits [death, divorce, etc.] to and from
the total and from each of the three states.  The core model is given by a set of three differential
equations, one for each state over time.  
The focus of the Rosero-Bixby analysis is on interaction diffusion or contagion. 
Movement to the latent and control classes is governed, in addition to the factors a and b noted
above, by terms reflecting social interaction between those in the control state and  those in the
natural state and in the latent state.  These terms are respectively hN(C/T) and hL(C/T), where N
and L are the sizes of the natural and latent classes, C/T the proportion in the control class, and h
and ‘instant rate of adequate contacts, including both mean number of interactions and a
probability of propagation per interaction’ [1993, p.158].  The behavioural assumption is that
people in the natural and latent states learn motivation to control fertility and/or knowledge of
how to do so through social interaction with controllers.
7Rosero-Bixby also present a model for a stratified or two-sector population [e.g., rural/urban or
upper-class/lower-class] with interaction diffusion between as well as within strata [but with no
‘migration’ from one strata to the other].    
Although Rosero-Bixby speak of their model as a ‘demand-supply’ model, they do so in a
sense different from Easterlin.  Their reference is to demand for and supply of fertility control;
his is to demand for and supply of children.  It is also important to note that their definition of
fertility does not allow for any increase in fertility early in a process of transition.  The fertility
levels of non-controllers and controllers are assumed fixed; and the proportion of controllers can
only rise -- a and b are always positive.
The basic dynamic in the Caldwell model [developed largely with reference to Third
World societies in Tropical Africa and Asia] is a change in the direction of ‘wealth flows’ such
that money and other resources flow from the older generation to the younger rather than from
the younger to the older, as under a patriarchal system.  In the latter system, the patriarch or head
of an extended family derives economic benefit from large numbers of children and
grandchildren.  From a purely economic point of view, the more children the better.  The system
breaks down with the import of Western cultural ideas and ideals of the nuclear family, and it
is this ‘family nucleation’ that leads to the change of direction in wealth flows, as couples
devote their resources to themselves and their children rather than to the elders.   The emphasis in
Caldwell’s scheme is on motivation to control fertility; thus, his ideas tie in closely with
Easterlin’s concept of motivation [presumably through demand for children] and with Rosero-
Bixby’s ‘instant rate of demand for birth control.’ 
8Although developed somewhat earlier, Caldwell’s theory may be seen as a special case of
Lesthaege’s more general theory of secular individualism as a central cultural factor in fertility
[and other demographic] transitions.  Ideas deriving from The Enlightenment and from the
French and American Revolutions lead people to favour their own individual well-being over
that of collectivities [eventually including even the nuclear family], and to give up adherence to
sacred traditions, both religious and political [e.g., the monarchy].  In the populations of which
Caldwell writes, it is precisely cultural Westernization that leads to the weakening of deference
to traditional norms centering on the patriarch, a breakdown of family piety, and to a greater
focus on the nuclear family, in what might be seen as a first step toward greater individualism.  
Lesthaege views his theory as a complement to economic theories, and posits complicated
interrelations between the cultural and economic spheres, with culture partly exogenous and
partly endogenous with respect to economic change.  His is perhaps the most complex and
complete of the major theories of fertility decline [besides dealing also with marriage, divorce,
cohabitation, etc.], and poses a major challenge to the modeller,  well beyond the scope of this
paper.
A Synthetic Model
A natural blending of the central ideas of Easterlin and of Rosero-Bixby can be modelled
as follows:
1] Instead of assuming an arbitrary time path for their factor a [their ‘instant rate of
demand for fertility control’], express it as a function of his ‘motivation for fertility control.’  
92] Instead of assuming an arbitrary time path for their factor b [their ‘instant rate of access
to fertility control’], express it as a function of his ‘costs of fertility control.’ 
The correspondence of the two sets of concepts seems almost perfect.
3] Rather than assuming unchanging fertility rates for non-controllers, define fertility
rates over time that are functions of ‘natural marital fertility’ as defined and estimated by
Easterlin.
4] Rather than assuming unchanging fertility rates for controllers, define fertility rates
over time that are functions of ‘desired number of children’ as defined and estimated by
Easterlin.  
In other words, Easterlin’s socio-economic theory provides a more dynamic underpinning
for the Rosero-Bixby state model, driving changes in key parameters in behaviourally meaningful
ways. One way of looking at the resulting blended model is that the Rosero-Bixby and Casterline
state model introduces delays into the basic Easterlin economic model.  It also yields new
concepts and measures, such as the ‘KAP-gap,’ the difference between the proportion who want
to control fertility and the proportion who do so. 
 In the model below, I have not yet introduced Rosero-Bixby and Casterline’s interaction
diffusion mechanisms.  In general, their addition would speed up the process of fertility decline,
and would require many re-specifications of the model.
A schematic diagram is given in Figure 1.  The Appendix gives the complete code for the
model, written in Professional Dynamo Plus.  The present model should be considered a ‘first
cut,’ or perhaps only a model sketch.  Considerable work is required on the specification of
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empirical inputs, functional forms, and parameters,  especially to model Easterlin’s demand for
children as a function of social and economic development, and to model the inputs [either 
through external diffusion or through autonomous cultural development] of the cultural
influences described by Lesthaege and by Caldwell. 
To incorporate Caldwell’s and Lesthaege’s ideas, one would have to add mechanisms for
external or ‘point source’ diffusion, bringing in Western cultural elements whose main result
would be to reduce demand for children [primarily through tastes and prices for children].  In
other words, their posited mechanisms would operate through the Easterlin sub-model.  In the
case of Lesthaege, secular individualism also would impact on the costs of fertility control,
especially through the weakening of traditional taboos [Caldwell does not deny the role of
fertility control techniques and costs, but his main argument does not emphasize it].  To capture
the deeper aspects of the Lesthaege theory, one would have to include empirical measures of
trends in real income, allowing them to affect fertility directly through microeconomic sectors of
the model, but also indirectly through their feedbacks on culture and aspirations.  This work lies
beyond the first steps presented below.
Figure 2 graphs a comparison of modelled fertility over time compared to observed rates
for Taiwanese women 35-39, as reported by Crimmins et al. [1984].  This shows only that the
model is plausible, given the several ad hoc and arbitrary functional definitions and parameter
values contained in this first version.  That is, the basic logic of the model makes sense, and it
can closely track actual experience for a limited experimental case.      
Discussion
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Even with the extensions, additions, and refinements mentioned above, the current model
will remain limited -- a model of marital fertility, in isolation from broader demographic
dynamics.  It does not deal with changing marriage patterns, for example, a potentially serious
omission given the common view that in the early stages of fertility transitions, control of marital
fertility and delayed marriage are partial substitute behaviours.  An isolated model of marital
fertility also will not include the impact of broader demographic dynamics relating to population
size, growth, and density, and the role of out-migration in relieving ‘population pressure.’  This is
of concern when one realizes that in the middle stages of demographic transition, population size
[and thus density] can easily double in well under 30 years [at growth rates of 2.5 to 3%], that is,
in a period shorter than a reproductive generation.  Feedback effects on fertility behaviour seem
likely.  A doubling of density would seem particularly relevant to a model incorporating Rosero-
Bixby and Casterline’s interaction diffusion mechanisms, since ‘contagion’ would tend to rise
with density, and also with migratory movement associated with population increase in local
areas [notably, urban-rural migration], as well as with literacy, communications infrastructure,
etc.
How far should the current model be extended?  A common axiom in the modelling
literature is that every model must be constructed for a specific purpose, and judgements as to a
model’s success must depend on its purpose.  My current aim is to try to achieve greater unity
and rigour in our theoretical statements about fertility decline -- modelling is being used
primarily as a tool for theoretical development -- to arrive at theoretical statements that seem
better to capture the dynamic complexity of real world processes than some earlier formulations. 
From this perspective, the present model can only be a first step; the extensions sketched above
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need to be incorporated.  The resulting models should be useful for scientific purposes of
explanation and prediction, and in variant forms, should lead to effective empirical testing of
conflicting theoretical ideas [see Cleland and Wilson, 1987, on ideational versus economic
explanations of fertility decline].
For policy and program purposes, extensions are needed, but in different directions -- to
add details on the role of government laws and policies [e.g., China’s one-child policy], and on
the nature and strength of family planning programs.  
Eventually there will be many different models of fertility and fertility decline, but one
hopes they will all share a common behavioural scientific core of validated theory, similar to
what has been presented above.  
This paper is presented as a small first step towards 21st century analysis -- away from
relatively simple, static, linear models and from purely verbal conceptual/theoretical
formulations, towards computer models that are complex and dynamic, and stated with greater
clarity and precision.        
*   *   *
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Appendix: Professional Dynamo Plus code
*  Synthesis of Easterlin and Rosero-Bixby/Casterline [30 Dec. 1996]
*  Data for Taiwan, 1957-73
*  The Easterlin Model
*  Empirical Data:
*  Survival rates as function of time
A   surv.k=tabhl(tsurv,time.k,0,16,4)
T   tsurv=0.843,0.879,0.901,0.939,0.977
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*  Desired family size as function of time
A   cd.k=tabhl(tcd,time.k,0,16,4)
T   tcd=4.4,4.37,4.28,3.97,3.66
*  Natural fertility as function of time
A   n.k=tabhl(tn,time.k,0,16,4)
T   tn=5.55,5.86,6.27,6.29,6.31
*  Number of methods known by time
A   meth.k=tabhl(tmeth,time.k,0,16,4)
T   tmeth=2.7,3.14,3.7,4.95,6.2 Note: first value estimated from '<3.0'
*  Observed fertility by time
A  bo.k=tabhl(tbo,time.k,0,16,4)
T  tbo=5.46,5.6,5.56,4.97,4.38
*  Chesnais series
A  tfr.k=tabhl(ttfr,time.k,0,16,4)
T  ttfr=6.0,5.6,4.8,4.1,3.2
*  Observed surviving children by time
A  co.k=tabhl(tco,time.k,0,16,4)
T  tco=4.6,4.898,5.01,4.56,4.11
*  The model
*  Potential family size
A  cn.k=n.k*surv.k
*  Costs of fertility control
A  cost.k=1/meth.k
*  Motivation to control fertility
A  mot.k=cn.k-cd.k
*  Net motivation or births averted; motivation minus costs or zero
A  nmot.k=max(mot.k-cost.k,0)
*  Fertility: natural fertility minus births averted
A  b.k=n.k-(nmot.k/surv.k)
*  Simulated surviving children
A  c.k=b.k*surv.k
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*  Zero for graphs
A  dummy.k=0
*  The Rosero-Bixby/Casterline Model
































    Control Statements
SAVE  surv,n,mot,cost,nmot,b,bo,co,c,cd,cn,dummy,y,kg,f,diff1,diff2,^
      relerr2,relerr1,total,natural,latent,contra,probb,proba,tfr,contf,nocontf
SPEC  dt=0.125/length=16/savper=1
      
 *   *   *    
      
        
 
                   
